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BANK EXPOSURE, CAPITALAND SECONDARY MARKEDISCOUNTS
ON DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT
ABST RACT
Previous empirical studies of secondary market discounts for developing countries
have ignored important creditor country factors. The empirical evidence in this paper
indicates that, after controlling for repayment indicators of borrower countries, bank exposure
and capital are important determinants of secondary market discounts: an increase in the
exposure of large banks to a particular country leads to a decrease in the secondary market
discounts on the debt of that country, while an increase in the capital of large banks leads to
an increase in secondary market discounts. Among the repayment indicators of developing
countries, only debt ratios are found to be significant determinants of the discounts. We
suggest that the impacts of exposure and capital can be explained by the presence of deposit
insurance. l'he evidence presented on the stock market pricing of lender banks supports this
view.
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and NBER1. Introduction
In the secondary market br developing country debtItaly Ill;in tradeat
large discounts. The magnitude of thesediscountsis considtred to reflect a
lack of confidence that the debts will ever be fully repaid, sincesecondary
market prices are regarded as indicators of the value of the outstanding debt.
In an attempt to understand the factors that influence the value of a
country's outstanding debt empirical studies have primarily focused on
economic characteristics of borrower countries that presumably affect their
repayment prospects, such as GN? per capita, and the debt—to—exports ratio.1
Some puzzles concerning the patterns of secondary market discounts,
however, remain to be explained: loans to countries with large conatercial bank
debt, such as Brazil and Mexico, sell at lower discounts than loans to smaller
debtors; debt prices fell during the eighties, even though countries were
making large repayments. Other developments of the period suggest that
characteristics of the creditors could provide some explanations for these
puzzles. In particular, during the eighties the position of commercial banks
changed substantially. banks strengthened their capital, and engaged in
significant amounts of interbank loan trading, changing the composition of
See for example Berg and Sachs (1989), Cohen (1988) Hajivassiliou
(1988), Huizinga (1989), Sachs and iluizinga (1987). These variables are
considered to he among the empirical measures suggested by thetheoretical
literature. For example seizure technology of thelenders,impatience of
various parties, the importance of future credit market access are suggested
as determinants of the value of debt (see Eaton and Cersovitz (1981), and
Bulow and Rogoff (I989b)).2
their loan portfolios. Tnterbank trading was in fact a very important
componentof trading in the secondary market 2
TheobjecLive of this paperistobetterunderstand the determinants of
secondary market discounts and provide an explanation forthese puzzles. For
thispurpose, we focus on a set of factors omitted by existingstudies of
secondary market pricing of debt. In particular, we conduct an empirical
analysis to determine if the degree of exposure and the sizeof the regulatory
capital of the lender banks have an impact on secondary marketdiscounts. We
consider the largest nine US banks. The data for exposure of thesebanks to
individual countries and their total capital are quarterly for the periodof
1986—1988. There are 41 countries in the sample, and the debt of 21 of these
countries has been traded in the secondary market. In order to address
potential problems due to sample selection we use a one step maximum
likelihood estimation procedure. In the estimation process we attempt to
control for countries' repayment prospects by using economic indicators of
borrower countries, in particular, their debt ratios.
Our primary findings are that bank exposure and capital are indeed
important determinants of discounts. The impacts of these variables are
substantial and they explain a significant component of the variation of
discounts across countries and over time, Specifically, a 4.1 billion 1986 US
dollars increase in the exposure of the )arge banks to a country is estimated
to reduce discounts by more than 10centson the dollar.3 A2.7 billion
269%of all trading activity in 1986 was interbank trading, compared to
35%in 1988.Source:Quarterly Review on Financial Flows to Developing
Countries p989).
We considerthelargestnine USbanks(size is measured by asset
value). The sample mean of exposure to the 21 countries with traded debts is
2.7 billion in 1986 dollars, with a standard deviation of 4.1. The mean of3
1986 USdollars increase in the capital of the largest U.S. banks is found to
increasediscounts by near)y 15 cents on the dollar. The only borrowing
countryrepayment indicators that: systcmatfcallyhave a statistically
significantimpact on discounts are various measures of the debt ratio, such
as debt to exports and debt to CNP.
We suggest that bank deposit insurance provides an explanation for our
results. Deposit insurance premia are flat rate premia and in particular do
not reflect the riskiness of a bank's asset portfolio. Hence, deposit
insurance encourages risk taking. Banks' incentives to take risk decrease
with their rate of capitalization, since the expected subsidy from the deposit
insurance agency is reduced. This suggests that increased exposure to a
country leads to a decline (increase) in the secondary marketdiscounts
(prices), and that increased capitalization leads to an increase in secondary
market discounts. This view appears consistent with the evidence for the
period. In particular, the smaller regional banks (which are typicallybetter
capitalized) used the secondary market to reduce their developing country
exposure.
The negative relationship between bank exposure and secondary market
discounts could stem from the behavior of the multilateral lending agencies
and large creditor country governments. Since these institutions are
concerned with financial stability, they may provide loans to especially large
borrowers to enhance their repayment prospects. While we cannot rule outthis
alternative by an investigation of secondary market pricing, we provide
evidence from the stock market that favors the deposit insurance explanation.
discounts for this group is 47.35 with a stadard deviation of 22.7. The
average capital aggregate of the large banks over the 1986—88 periodis 47
billion 1986 US dollars, with a standard deviation of 2.7.4
Alternatively, large banks may be argued simply to have chosen to lend to
the higher quality borrowers in the first place, or they may have chosen to
syndicate a smaller share of high quality loans. Our results, however, are
obtained after controlling for creditworthiness indicators of borrowers. In
particular, we are careful to control for alternative measures of debt ratios,
such as debt—to—exports, and debt—to—GNP.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains
the empirical investigation of secondary market discounts. Section 3 provides
a discussion of potential explanations of the empirical findings as well as an
evaluation of evidence on the stock market valuation of bank assets. Section
4 concludes
2.Do Bank Exposure and Capital Affect Secondary Narket Discounts?
2.1 Methodology
In the secondary market for developing country loans, debts of only some
countries have been traded. The discounts on loans are observed for those
countries with debts traded in this market. This suggests that a sample
selection model is the correct specification of the determination of
discounts. We leave the discussion of the explanatory variables and the
sample characteristics to the next section, and first describe the selection
model consisting of the following equations:
(1) D —1X+ u1
If instead ordinary least squares is used the resulting estimates could
be biased.5
where U—discountin the secondary market. Discount is defined as (1—
prie) where price is the secondary market price of $1 of debt.
X—variablesrelevant for the pricing of debt In the socondary
market.
U1 —errorterm.
Discounts are observed when an underlying variable T* crosses seine threshold
as described in the following model:
(2) T —flX'--u2
where T* —alatent variable such that if T* >0we observe trading at a
discount in the secondary market, but if T* ￿0we do not observe
trading at a discount in the secondary market
—variablesthat determine the occurrence of trading in the
secondary market, possibly different from X above,
u2 —errorterm.
This model is a standard sample selection model, where the error terms
are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution, with standard deviations
ü and °z and with covariance 02 (where p2 —0122/°io).1 We estimate this
model in one step maximum likelihood procedure. The identification condition
for the equations require that as below there be one element of X' that is not
in X. Alternatively, one coulc( rely on the nonlinearity of the fitted
probabilities in the selection equation to identify the parameters of the
model.
2.2 Specification and Data
The impact of bank exposure and bank capital on the secondary market
discounts is investigated using the discount equation (1) and the probit
specification of trading in the secondary market as described in equation (2).
See Beckman (1979) for a discussion of selection models.6
Our data consists of quarterly information on 41 developing countries, based
on data availability, for the period of 1986—88. The debts of 21 countries
were traded at a discount. In this section we discuss the variables and the
data used in this analysis.
Equation (1) is a reduced form specification of the equilibrium prices in
the secondary market. Hence, the explanatory variables should incorporate all
the exogenous factors influencing lender and borrower behaviour. These
include pertinent economic indicators of borrower countries, which have been
used in several empirical studies addressing various issues concerning
developing country debt.6 The borrowing country indicators are attemtps to
measure the variables suggested by the theoretical literature such as costs a
defulting country suffers. A typical set of these indicators includes: debt—
to—exports ratio, reserves—to—imports ratio, real CNP per capita, and the rate
of inflation. Our base specification use these variables as country
indicators.7This study introduces bank exposure and bank capital variables
into this equation.
In principle, some of the explanatory variables could be correlated with
the error term. For example, the exposure variable may be endogenous since
large discounts could affect the exposure of banks if write—offs are taken.
Real CNP per capita, and reserves—to—CNP could also be correlated with the
error term. To address this problem we used one quarter lagged values of the
6SeeEaton and Taylor (for a review), Ozler (l991a,b), and Ozler and
Tabellini (1991).
'Berg and Sachs (1989) control for variables that are considered to
reflect the structural and political features of the borrowers such as share
of agriculture in GD? and a measure of income distribution. These variables
are available on a cross section basis. Ozler and Tabellini (1991) employ a
measure of political instability, which has annual frequency.7
potentially endogenous explanatory variables.8We also consider a
specification that uses only the beginning of the sample values for the
exposure variable.
Equation (2) incorporates all country indicators used in equation (1) and
a rescheduling agreement indicator. We expect that the latter variable will
influence the occurrence of trading. Almost all countries whose debt has been
traded have reached rescheduling agreements with commercial banks, unlike the
remaining countries.9 In contrast, we do not expect the occurrence of an
agreement to affect the magnitude of discounts. Consequently, our prior is
that this variable will serve well as an identifying variable. The
rescheduling agreement variable we employ for this purpose is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if there was a rescheduling agreement with
commercial banks during the previous quarter.'°
To see how the countries with traded debts differ from the remaining
group we compare the means and standard errors of repayment indicators (as
presented in Table A.l in the Appendix). Overall, the repayment indicators
appear worse for the 21 countries with traded debts.
8Dealing with these concerns in an econometrically satisfactory way would
re,quire joint estimation of these variables with the discounts. It is
extremely difficult to do this with the roughly 400 observations we have.
Furthermore, a very complex system of structural equations would be required.
98 % of the countries with debts that are traded during 1986—88 reached
rescheduling agreements with creditor banks between 1978—86. Only 2 % of
countries whose debts were not traded during 1986—88 did not have any
rescheduling agreements with banks since the inception of such formal
agreements in the late l970s.
10 The mean value of this variable is .10 for the 21 country group with a
standard deviation of .3 (over the 12 quarters in 1986—88 period). For the
entire group the mean value is .005 with a standard deviation of .07.8
Themean discountfor aUcountrieswith traded debts over the period
1986—88 is 47.35(witha standard deviation of 22.73) and the mean exposure is
2.74 billion 1986 US dollars (with a standard deviation of 4.14). The data
indicate that small borrowers, such as Bolivia, trade at relatively large
discounts. (Some summary information on secondary market discounts for the 21
countries with debts that trade at a discount and bank exposures for the 1986—
88 period are in Table A.2. in the Appendix.)
An important feature of the data is the pattern of secondary market
spreads, calculated as the percentage differences between the offer and bid
prices quoted in the secondary market. For countries with large discounts,
spreads also are quite large, which suggests an investigation of bid prices
alone may be potentially misleading. Accordingly, we employ secondary market
prices that are calculated using the average of bid and ask prices."
Alternatively, we use the spreads as an explanatory variable in a
specification that computes the discounts based on bid prices only.
2.3 Results
The primary results of our investigation are that increased bank exposure
leads to a decrease in secondary market discounts, and that increased
capitalization of banks leads to an increase in discounts, holding countries'
repayment prospects constant. In this section, we first discuss the
estimation results and then address a nuniber of sensitivity issues.
In Table I, the results from a maximum likelihood estimation of the
discount equation and the probit equation are presented. In the first column
we eiiiploy a set of base country indicators in both equations. These
'Acouple of countries whose debts have been traded have not been
incorporated into the analysis. Liberia and Sudan had extraordinarily high
spreads, 37 % and 60 % respectively.9
indicatorsare: debt—to—exports ratio, reserves—to—imports ratio, real CNP per
capita, and rateofinflation. In addition, the rescheduling agreement
variableisincluded in the probit equation.
Only debt toexports ratioaffects the discounts significantly. In
contrast, the occurrence of trading is significantly affected by other country
repayment indicators, such as inflation rate and GNP per capita. The finding
that most country indicators do not affect secondary market prices is in
contrast to the role played by these indicators in studies of credit terms on
new loans and in predicting reschedulings.'2
In column 2 the rescheduling agreement variable is included in both
equations. As expected, the agreement variable appears to affect the
occurrence of trading in the secondary markets but not the magnitude of
discounts.
In column 3, we report results concerning exposure and capital, the
variables of primary interest for this study. The findings indicate that
exposure has a negative effect, and capital a positive impact on discounts.
Both parameters appear to be statistically significant.13
Incorporation of these variables leads to some different results which is
evident in a comparison of column 3 with the previous columns. Most important
of all is that incorporation of exposure and capital variablçs influences the
parameter estimates of reserves to imports ratio ?nd the real GNP, suggesting
Further investigation of various debt markets and instruments should
be undertaken to uncover the sources of this difference. The findings of
Stone (1991) are in accordance with ours as the author reports that the
changes in the secondary market prices are insensitive to changes in country
specific macro economic aggregates, such as exports, reserves and imports.
These findings continue to hold irrespective of whether identification
is addressed with the rescheduling variable, or simply by relying on
functional forms.10
the presence of omitted varisbles bias in specifications that do not
incorporate these variables. Reserves to imports ratio is now estimated to be
a statistically significant determinsnt of discounts."
In addition, incorporation of the capital variable detracts from the
positive impact of year dummies on discounts reported in the previous
specifications. Finally, the magnitude of the constant is increased due to
the incorporation of the capital variable.'5
In column 4 the spread between the bid and ask prices is used as an
additional explanatory variable (where the discounts are calculated using the
bid prices). The impact of exposure and the impact of capital on discounts
are robust to this variation in the specification.
The impacts of exposure and capital on discounts are quite substantial.
Consider for example the estimates of —.16 and 6 for exposure and capital
respectively. Civen our sample these magnitudes imply the following: a 4.1
billion 1986 US dollars increase in the exposure of the large banks to a
country is estimated to reduce discounts by 11 cents on the dollar. A 2.7
billion 1986 US dollars increase in the capital of largest U.S. banks is found
to increase discounts by nearly 16 cents on the dollar.
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we attempt a
number of alternative specifications for the two equations. Our main
quantitative results continue to hold.
' For a discussion of the role of reserves in debt negotiations see
O'Connell (1989). That study suggests that the sign of the reserves variable
should be positive as it increases the bargaining power of borrowers vis—a—vis
banks, decreasing repayment prospects.
15 The sample mean of this variable (in its log form) is 17.6. An
estimated parameter value near 6.3 explains most of the jump in the constant.11
In the specifications presented above the estimated correlation between
the error terms of the two equations is not 'arge and not statistically
significant as indicated byp. This suggests that the evidence for sample
selection is not strong. We estimated these specifications with the ordinary
least squares (OLS) method for the countries whose debt were traded. The
point estimates of all the explanatory variables are smilar to the maximum
likelihood estimates (MLE). The standard errors obtained using the OLS
procedureare generally smaller than the ones obtained using the MLE
procedure. As a consequence, some of the country indicators that are not
found statistically significant in the HLE estimation are found significant at
low levels of confidence when OLS is used. Debt to export ratio, exposure
and capital variables are the only variables that remain significant at high
levels of confidence, irrespective of the estimation procedure.
An alternative set of country repayment indicators are incorporated into
the analysis. In particular, we replace debt—to—exports and reserves—to—
imports with debt, reserves and imports all scaled by GM'. Exposure and
capital variables are estimated with nearly the same parameter values and
statistically significant at high levels of confidence. Debt to GNP ratio is
the only country indicator that is a significant determinant of spreads.
We investigate the impact of aJ.ternative dummy variable specifications
for time affects, such a using quarterly dummy variables, and dropping the
dummyvariablesentirely. None of these changes has any major impact on our
general findings.
Exposure to capital ratio is included in the probit equation. The
variable is found to have a statistically significant positive impact on the12
occurrence of trading in the market. The results concerning the discount
equation are not influenced.
As banks have a significantly high exposure to Brazil and Mexico one
might suspect that having these countries in the sample drives our results.
Excluding them, however, does not change our qualitative findings. The impact
of exposure on discounts is estimated approximately one standard deviation
larger with a parameter estimate of —.20 and a standard error of .05.
One might argue that using only one lagged value of the exposure variable
does not properly address the potential endogeneity of this variable. We
replace the quarterly measure of the exposure variable with simply its
beginning of the sample value for each country. This renders it a constant
for each country, reflecting the exposure of banks one quarter prior to the
beginning of our sample period. All estimates stay nearly the same as our
base specification. The exposure is estimated to have a parameter value of
—.17 and a standard error of .05.
Finally, our results continue to hold when we employ exposure of a larger
set of banks. In particular, we replace the exposure and capital of the
largest 9 banks with the exposure and capital of the largest 24 U.S. banks.
The corresponding results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported, but
the exposure variable di,splays a smaller estimated parameter value.
3. Exolanation for the Results
In this section we suggest that our findings concerning the impact of
exposure and bank capital on discounts can be explained by deposit insurance.
We also consider other plausible explanations and provide further evidence to
support the view that deposit insurance is an explanation of our findings.13
Deoosit Insurance
It has long been recognized that flat i.ate deposit insurance andlunited
liability create incentives for banks to take excessive risk. For example,
with regard to banks' overexposure to developing countries, Penati and
Protopapadakis (1988) show that federal deposit insurance tends to subsidize
risky loans and that the subsidy increases with the riskiness of a bank's
loans. The authors suggest that deposit insurance explains the banks'
overexposure to developing countries and the earlier underpricing of loans.
Deposit insurance can similarly provide an explanation for the
relationship between bank exposure, capital and secondary market discounts.
Since the onset of the debt crisis, banks are no longer in the business of
making new loans to developing countries. Instead, banks may use the
secondary market as a means to alter their developing country loan porfolios.
The deposit insurance subsidy can be expected to increase with the riskiness
of a bank's developing country loan portfolio. Thus the banks have an
incentive to buy additional debts of those countries to which they already are
heavily exposed, and they may be willing to pay higher secondary market prices
for such loans.16 Regulatory capital affects secondary market prices in a
similar fashion. The particularly well capitalized banks are willing to pay
less for developing country debt. This is because, for these banks, the
expected 4eposit insurance agency payments are smaller and the cost of
obtaining them in case of bankruptcy is higher.
A look at stock market pricing of lender banks' shares provides
additional evidence for the views that the value of deposit insurance to banks
16 We do not observe complete specialization. One reason is that the
exposure of each bank to a country is restricted not to exceed 15% of bank
capital by regulatory agencies.14
is substantial. Several studies have found that developing country exposure
has a negative impact on bank share values.'7 Bank share values are not only
determined by expected cash repayments, but in part by the deposit insurance.
Of course, U.S. banks differ widely in their developing country exposure and
capitalization rates, and thus these banks face very different probabilities
of ever drawing any funds from the deposit insurance agency. In particular,
heavily exposed banks have a more valuable contingent claim on the deposit
insurance agency. This suggests that bank share values do not decline
linearly with exposure for a given asset base because the value of banks'
contingent claim on the deposit insurance agency to some extent softens the
negative impact of exposure on bank values.
To investigate whether the relationship between bank stock prices and
exposure is in fact non—linear, we estimate the following equation:
ES—K ____ L 2
(3) f h —C ( f h+
f h L +L L +L L +L
where,
ES —marketvalue of common equity calculated as the stock price times
the number of shares outstanding,
K —bookvalue of common equity plus loan loss reserves,
Lt —bookvalue of developing country loan exposure,
Lt +L5—totalhook assets plus loan loss reserves.
Equation (3) is an accounting identity that restricts the market values of
non—developing country assets and bank liabilities to be equal to their book
'Seefor example Huizinga (1989) and Sachs and Huizinga (198]). Ozier
(1989) finds a negative impact for the 81—83 crisis period, but a positive
impact for the 78—80 period.15
values. The adjustment Involved Inequation(3) is allowing the market values
of developing country assets to differ from theirbookvalues. Hence(3)
relatesthedeviation of abank's market valuo from its book value (thvided by
assets) to developing country assets as a share of total assets.'8
The null hypothesis tested with equation (3) is a, —0.Rejection of
this in favor of a positive a supports the deposit insurance hypothesis.
The sample consists of 23 banks for the year 1987. The Lt variable captures
the exposure of banks to four large Latin debtor countries: Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.'9 The regression results are reported in
Table 2. The negative estimate of a indicates that developing country
exposure leads to discounts in the stock market valuation of bank assets. The
quadratic term is found positive and statistically significant.
The parameter values for equation (3) are used to calculate how bank
value declines for a one dollar increase of developing country exposure (the
marginal discount). The evidence shows that heavily exposed banks value
developing country debt more highly at the margin than the less exposed banks
as indicated by less negative marginal discounts in Table 2. The disparity of
marginal discounts is consistent with the evidence that especially the smaller
See Sachs and Huzinga (1987) for similar estimations. The
restrictions incorporated in equation (3) are supported by our data. For
instance, the estimate of the market value of non—developing country assets is
.995 and it is statistically significant at high levels of confidence, if left
to be determined by an equation similar to (3). Estimation of (3) without the
quadratic term yields an estimate of a of —0.641 with a t—statistic of
—10.87.
19Stockprice data are for November 31, 1987. All other data are for
the end of 1987. The limitation to four countries is because banks are
required to disclose developing country exposure to individual countries only
if in excess of 1 percent of assets.16
regional banks used the secondary market to reduce their developing country
exposure during the period considered.
Implicit Insurance
An alternative explanation may stem from the behavior of multilateral
lending agencies and creditor country governments. One of the aims of these
institutions is to safeguard the stability of the creditor country banking
systems. Thus they are more likely to provide lending to debtors towhich
banks are more heavily exposed if those countries experience payments
problems. In this manner these third parties will be enhancing the repayment
prospects of those large debtors, providing implicit insurance to the banks.
This could explain the negative relation between exposure and discounts.
While we cannot rule out that implicit insurance of this kind may be at
work, our evidence from the stock market supports the view that deposit
insurance is primarily operating. The varying marginal debt values across
banks cannot be explained by any differences in treatment of debtor countries
by implicit insurance, because banks of different sizes tend to hold
developing country loan portfolios of more or less equal country
c ompo s it ion 20
Additional evidence, somewhat cursory in nature, also provides support
for the deposit insurance explanation. Average discounts increased from 44.8
to 64.7 between the first quarter of 1986 and the final quarter of 1988, while
a large number of the borrowers have been making net transfers to their bank
creditors. One potential explanation for this pattern is that net repayments
20 Exposure to Latin America scaled by exposure to all developing
countries is approximately the same when the largest banks are compared to the
smaller banks: the ratio is .60, .63, .61 for the top 9, next 15, and the
remaining nearly 150 banks respectively at the end of 1987.17
inthecurrentperiod simply are not good indicators offutureLepaylnent
prospects.More likely, the time path of thediscounts has resul .ulioin the
strengtheningofthe regulatory capital position of U.S. banks.
Choiceof gorrowers
An explanation of the impact of bank exposure might be argued tolie in
how bankschoose among the countries to which theymake loans. Largebanks
maysimply have chosen to lend selectively only to higher quality borrowers.
This argument suggests that the exposure variable may just be a proxy for some
further unknown omitted variable that measures the creditworthiness of the
borrower. We have, however, controlled for several repayment indicators. In
particular, we have employed various measures of indebtedness, scaled by
countries exports or CNP. Throughout, the impact of the exposure variable
remains significant.
A variant of the above argument might be that the large banks may have
chosen to sell a smaller share of their high quality loans to syndicate banks.
Accordingly, one may suspect that our exposure variable is an empirical proxy
for such a concentration variable. Sut other evidence indicates that exposure
and concentration do indeed have independent influences on the secondury
market, as demonstrated in Fernandez and Ozier (1991). The partial
correlation between the measure of concentration and our exposure variable is
negligible and not statistically significant. Furthermore, the econometric
investigation of secondary market discounts, in Fernandez and Ozjer,
indicates that exposure continues to play an important role in explaining
discounts even after controlling for the potential impact of concentration.18
5 Concluding Remarks
This paperhas demonstrated empirically thatexposureoflarge banks has
animportantand statistical ly significant negativeimpactonthe sizesof
secondary market discounts for developing country debt inthe l980s21The
evidencealso suggests that bank capital has a strong positive impact on
discounts. We indicate that the presence of a deposit insurance agency in
lender countries provides an explanation for these results. Evidence on stock
market valuation of bank exposure is offered in support of this view.
The results of this paper contribute to policy evaluations in several
ways and suggest important areas for future work: First, these results
undermine the standard argument for using secondary market prices as
guidelines for possible debt relief to developing countries. It is clearly
arbitrary to permit debt forgiveness on a basis dependent on characteristics
of creditor country financial institutions. A second issue concerns debt
buybacks. In several recent papers Bulow and Rogoff (l988a,b) have argued
that debt buybacks are harmful to the debtor country because the country ends
up paying the average market price to retire marginal debt. The presence of
deposit insurance strengthens the argument that the country (in particular a
large exposure country) pays too much, since the market price now ref'Lects the
average payment per dollar of debt from the country, as well as an implicit
subsidy from the deposit insurance agency.22 Third, our findings support the
21 As the paper suggests banks recapitalization in the 1980s implies that
insurance is less important in secondary market pricing recently.
22 The Bulow and RagoUt (1988 a,b) result that the market price rises
after a buyback cannolonger be considered to be necessarily correct. After
thebuyback, the average expected payout from the deposit insurance agency may
be reduced even if the average expected payment per dollar of debt from the
country rises.19
view that deposit insurance biases banks against providing debt forgiveness
(Krugman (1990)). The potent isi gains of debt forgiveness to creditors may be
undervalued by banks withinsureddeposits, because forgiveness may lower the
expected subsidy provided by deposit insurance. Finally, this research
suggests that other factors concerning the regulatoryand tax environment in
the lender countries or factors that concern the creditors themselves may be
potentially important determinants in the secondary market pricingof
developing country loans.20
References
Berg, A. and J. Snchs,"The DeLLCrisis: Structural Explanations of
Country Performance," Journa' of Development Economics 29, 271—306,
1989.
Bulow, J. and K. Rogoff, "The Buyback Boondoggle," Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 2, 675—698, 1988(a).
"Multilateral Sovereign Debt Reschedulings," International
Monetary Fund Staff Papers 35, 644—57, 1988(b).
Classens, S., I. Diwan, K. Froot, P. Krugman, "Market Based Debt Reductin for
Developing Countries: Principles and Prospects" mimeo, 1990
Cohen, D. ,"Isthe Discount on the Secondary Market a Case for LDCDebt
Relief?," PPR Working Paper 132, World Bank, 1988.
Fernandez, R. and S. Ozier, "Debt Concentration and Secondary Market
Prices : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis" NBER Working Paper
No: 3654, 1991.
Froot, K. "Buybacks, Exit Bonds, and the Optimality of Debt and Liquidity
Relief" International Economic Review.
Hajivassiliou, V.," Do Secondary Markets Believe in Life After Debt?" in
H. Ishrat and I. Diwan (eds.) Dealing with the Debt Crisis, World
Bank, Washington D.C. ,276—292,1989.
Heckinan, i.,' Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,"
Econometrica Vol 47, no 1, 153—161, 1979.
iluizinga H.,' The Commercial Bank Claims on Developing Countries: How
Have Banks Been Affected?" in H. Ishrat ard I. Diwan (eds.) Dealing
with the Debt Crisis, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 129—143, 1989.
Krugrnan, P.,"BankRegulation and LDC Debt", MIT mimeo, 1990.
O'Connell A.S.,"Abargaining Theory of International Reserves", mimeo
August 1989.
Ohstfeld, M. "Capital Mobility in the World Economy: Theory and Measurement",
in K.Brunner and A.H. Meltzer (eds) Carnegie—Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy, Spring 1986, 24.
Ozier, S., "Onthe RelationBetween Reschedulings and Bank Value," Ih
AmericanECOnOmICReview79, 1117—1131, 1989.21
______"Evolutionof Credit Terms: An Empirical Study of Commercial Bank
LendingtoDeveloping Countries," forthcoming Journal of Develoiment
EconomIcs 1991(a).
_______"HaveCommercialBanksIgnored History 9" UCLAmimeo,1991(b)
________aridTabellini, "External Debt and Political Instability", NPER
Working Paper, No:3772, July 1991.
Penati, A., and A. Protopapadakis, "The Effects of Implicit Deposit
Insurance on Banks' Portfolio Choices with an Application to
International 'Overexposure'," Journal of Monetary Economics 21,
107—126, 1988.
Quarterly Review on Financial Flows to Developing Countries, World Bank,
1989.
Purcell, J. and D. Orlanski, "Developing Country Loans: A New Valuation
Model for Secondary Market Trading," Corporate Bond Research,
Salomon Brothers Inc. ,NewYork, June 1988
Sachs, J. and H. Huizinga. "U.S. Commercial Banks and the Developing—
Country Debt Crisis," Brookins Pacers on Economic Activity, 1987.
Stone, M. "Sovereign Debt Secondary Market Returns," Journal of International
Money and Finance, 1991.22
Table 1.Xaximuin Likelihood Estimates of Discounts and Trading
Nobs:Tradedinsecondaty mkt —225,Nottraded —208
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimates of the Discounts: Equation (1)'
Debt/Exports2 0.0012** 0.0013** 0.00ll** 0.0008**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Reserves/Import 0.0009 0.0010 0.0019* 0.0015*
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Real CNP —0.1855 —0.1868 —0.0239 —0.01097
(0.1349) (0.1358) (0.1387) (0.1226)
Inflation 0.0070 0.0084 0.0108 0.0084
(0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0074)
Rescheduling 0.2335
Agreement (0.3485)
Year —1987 0.1436 0.1377 —0.3501 —0.3238
(0.1007) (0.1009) (0.2109) (0.1925)
Year —1988 0.5015 0.5113 —0.3374 —0.2082







Constant 3.0618 2.9715 —105.1740 —81.1875
(0. 3181) (0.3347) (38. 2666) (33.7335)23
Table 1. (cont.)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimates of the Probit Equation
Debt/Exports2 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0012**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Reserves/Import 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Real CNP _0.2441** _0.2436** —0.2422** _0.2419**
(0.1085) (0.1082) (0.1080) (0.1061)
Inflation 0.1360** 0.1384** 0.1390** 0.1412**
(0.0269) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0271)
Rescheduling 1.8672 1.8630 1.8356 1.8085
Agreement (0.6540) (0.6538) (0.6629) (0.6680)
Year —1987 —0.0990 —0.0985 —0.0976 —0.0995
(0.1661) (0.1661) (0.1659) (0.1657)
Year —1988 —0.1269 —0.1362 —0.1398 —0.1470
(0.1890) (0.1893) (0.1909) (0.1912)
Constant —0.6939 —0.6951 —0.7001 —0.7029
(0.1926) (0.1924) (0.1940) (0.1935)
0.1300 0.1304 0.1136 0.1692
(0.3579) (03582) (0.3511) (0.2791)
Log—Likelihood—441.7900 —440.7700—4236500 —392.3800
**indicates significance at 98% and * indicates significance at
95% level of confidence.
The discount rate is measured as 100 less the average of
the bid and ask prices in specifications (1)—(4); in
specification (5) it is measured as the bid price.
2 The ratios and inflation are in percent. Real percapita
CNP, exposure and capital are inthousandsof 1986 US
dollars. Exposure, capital and the dependent variable
discount, are all in natural logarithms in the specifications
reported here.
Standard errors in parentheses.
P— "12/24
Table 2. OLSEstimatesof Stock Market Valuation
A. Estimated equation (3)
a0 a1 Nobs. Adj. R—square
—1.057 7.099 23 0.46
(—6.43) (2.67)
B. Marginal Discounts for U.S. Banks1
Bank Exposure to Exposure to Latinfour!Marginal
Latin four assets plus loan discount
(millions) loss reserves
(percentage)
Citicorp 9,100 4.37 —0.41
Chase Manhattan 6,440 6.32 —0.31
BankAmerica 7,025 7.31 —0.26
Chemical 4,401 5.48 —0.36
J.P. Morgan 4,350 5.64 —0.35
Man. Hanover 6,571 8.65 —0.19
Sec. Pacific 1,558 2.09 —0.53
Bankers Trust 2,778 4.81 —0.39
First Interstate 1,047 2.01 —0.54
First Chicago 2,237 6.89 —0.39
Wells Fargo 1,542 3.39 —0.47
PNC Financial 322 0.87 —0.60
Bank of Boston 851 2.44 —0.52
Mellon 1,111 3.51 —0.46
Bank of New Eng. 261 0.87 —0.60
First Bank System 307 1.13 —0.59
Irving Bank 1,391 5.74 —0.34
Bank of N.Y. 533 2.27 —0.52
Republic N.Y. 455 2.01 —0.54
Norwest 285 1.35 —0.57
Midlantic 261 1.45 —0.57
National City 196 1.29 —0.58
Mercantile Bank 188 2.71 —0.50
Marginal discounts are for total developing country exposure of U.S. banks.
Sources: 10—K reports, Salomon Brothers' Review of Bank Performance, and the Wall
Street Journal.25
APPENDIX
Table A.1. Sample Characteristics
Country Indicators (1986—1988)
ForCountries Whose Assets Are:1
Traded NotTraded
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Debt/Exports 4.02 2.47 2.62 2.22
0.74 Reserves/Imports 1.20 1.00 1.03
2.05 Real GNP 1.30 0.76 2.03
Inflation 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.03
Debt/CNP 0.71 0.34 0.40 0.16
0.64 Reserves/CNP 0.22 0.18 0.39
0.37
Imports/C; 0.22 0.11 0.37
The countries whith debt traded in the secondary market are: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa—Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras,
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Turkey, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Yugoslavia. Zaire.
The remaining countries in our sample are: Cameroon, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Greece, Hungary. India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Portugal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,Tunisia.
Variable Definitions:
(All variables except GNP and debt are quarterly.)
Debt/exports : Ratio of total public outstanding debt to exports
Reserves/imports : Ratio of total reserves to imports
Real CNP : GNP per capita in thousands of 1986 U.S. dollars
Inflation : Rate of inflation
Debt/GNP : Total public debt to CNP ratio
Imports/GNP : Imports to GNP ratio
Reserves/GNP : Reserves to CNP ratio
Sources :International Financial Statistics (IMF), World Debt Tables (The
World Bank).26
Table A.2. Secondary Market Discounts and Bank Exposure'
Country Discount DeviationSpread Exposure
Argentina 53.34 18.75 2.82 652
Bolivia 91.31 2.00 18.32 0.04
Brazil 41.01 13.68 2.42 15.80
Chile 36.94 4.75 2.43 3.89
Colombia 23.93 10.18 2.00 1.45
Costa Rica 70.67 15.16 9.49 0.19
Dominican Republic 65.42 11.90 7.05 0.28
Ecuador 54.31 19.42 4.30 1.16
Honduras 67.29 8.42 8.46 0.05
Ivory Coast 43.95 21.64 5.56 0.28
Jamaica 59.72 4.99 9.42 0.11
Mexico 46.74 5.10 2.38 13.19
Morocco 38.77 9.44 3.16 0.59
Panama 49.14 21.37 5.97 0.51
Peru 87.80 6.41 18.63 0.54
Philippines 40.50 8.29 3.03 3.32
Turkey 2.54 0.65 1.46 1.09
Uruguay 36.12 4.73 2.91 0.67
Venezuela 35.96 12.33 2.14 6.02
Yugoslavia 34.91 15.99 2.46 1.23
Zaire 77.91 2.80 13.88 0.01
Discount is the mean of (100—bid price) for the 1986—88 period.
Deviation is the standard deviation of the discounts.
Spread is calculated as the percentage difference between the bid
and ask prices.
Exposure is for the nine largest U.S. banks in $billion.
Sources: Indicative Prices for Less Developed Country Bank Loans (Salornon
Brothers), and Country Exposure LendingSurvey(Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council).